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Examination of the ICOM definition of a museum reveals a 
conception of the museum institution as an empty container with 
sharp boundaries between it and its users. None of its meanings 
seem to be drawn from an interface with people. By contrast, early 
museums and Renaissance cabinets of curiosities mirrored the power 
of their wealthy owners and were often installed in their homes, thus 
signalling strong meaning connections between the owner and the 
collection – and the owner, the collection and his or her carefully 
chosen visitors. Being permitted to touch objects was common in this 
early period, with touch understood to give access to deeper 
knowledge about artefacts, but the potential damage posed by 
visitors’ bodies was also well known. Classen (2005, p. 276) gives an 
example of the tension between artefact protection and visitors’ 
expectations: “when the underkeeper of the Ashmolean in 1760 tried 
to prevent a museum visitor from handling artefacts he was accused 
of incivility”. The tactile rights of visitors were to change radically. 
From the time of the nineteenth century professionalization of the 
great national museums, for example, the British Museum and the 
Louvre, the museum was conceptualized implicitly as a transparent, 
container-like space in which artefacts and interpretation were 
displayed as if there were no connection between the exhibits, the 
exhibition space and visitors, indeed, visitors became an explicit 
curatorial problem because they could cause damage. The assumed 
absence of a relationship between artefacts and display space was 
reinforced by a further crucial assumption, that artefacts could be 
exhibited in a politically neutral manner as if their meanings emerged 
only from their physical presence. Institutional self-reflexivity, 
however, was among the effects of post-colonialism and the New 
Museology with the result that the political underpinning of the 
western understanding of museums was exposed and with it the 
ideological nature of exhibition itself. 
 
Adjustments continue to be made to the museum institution as it 
reconfigures itself in the light of progressive political challenges, but 
the embodied presence of visitors remains absent in all but 
management terms – bodies must be kept distant from artefacts, they 
must be given bathrooms, cafes and public programmes, but the 
physical and textual realities of bodies in the museum environment is 
rarely taken into account. It is only in startling museums such as 
Daniel Libeskind’s Jewish Museum Berlin that the reality of the 
visiting body is regarded as a vital part of the communication process 
(see Harris, 2012). In most museums, the textual reality of the 
embodied presence of visitors is ignored. In museum discourse, 
therefore, artefacts can be seen to have occupied a conceptually 
higher place than visitors in textual terms because artefacts, at least, 
have been recognised as existing in the “empty” museum space while 
visitors have been implicitly conceptualised as a kind of “flotsam and 
jetsam” that necessarily washes up in the museum space, creating a 
mess and possibly posing danger – a “category of awkward and 
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unwelcome bodies” says Leahy (2012, p. 12)  –  but almost never 
contributing fundamentally to the museum text in construction. 
 
Increasing institutional interest in the reading positions of visitors and 
museums’ orientation to their audiences have led to the growth of 
interactive interpretation strategies. Such strategies, however, often 
privilege curatorially pre-determined responses and presuppose that 
visitors are disembodied, that actual bodies moving through exhibition 
spaces are not the observable reality. Even though control of visitors, 
and protection of artefacts from them, is a substantial part of any 
museum management work, interpretation has assumed mostly that 
the visitor is reduced to a disembodied, surveying eye, a seeing entity 
whose body is erased in terms of meaning. Visitors, in an odd twist of 
the indisputable fact of their bodily existence, have had a kind of 
textual invisibility in the curatorial and managerial imagining of the 
museum environment. Museums pay ever-increasing attention to 
visitors via proliferation of visitor studies and exhibitions designed to 
be engaging but, contradictorily, the reality of the bodily presence of 
visitors is mostly denied. Leahy’s (2012) ground-breaking work on the 
place of real bodies in museums surveys the history of comportment 
in European museums. She describes the way in which the polite 
norms of visiting were formed around managing the bodily presence 
of visitors. This paper builds on her work to show the implications for 
the ICOM definition of a museum if visitors’ bodies were conceptually 
reintegrated into museum texts. 
 
This paper argues that by continuing to deny the corporeal, textual 
presence of visitors, especially of their walking in the exhibition halls, 
museum professionals are continually misrecognising the museum 
institution which is conceptualized, in a taken-for-granted mode, as 
separate from their visitors. Analysis, however, of the walking visitor 
shows that the museum is not separate from the visitor. Philosophies 
of walking show that a place comes into being through the human 
walking presence. This paper begins by considering the nature of 
space and the conception of vision in a museum before looking at 
walking philosophies in order to begin to reframe a question which 




Space, vision and the ICOM definition of a museum 
 
The common sense assumption of physical space as an empty 
container is an everyday norm in the early 21
st
 century. There is a 
large gap between scholarly investigation of space and the everyday 
grasp of the concept. Tiwari (2010, p. 14) surveys the major 
underlying conceptions: space as an empty container in Euclidean 
and Newtonian philosophy; space as defined by objects and their 
relationships in the Cartesian conception, and space produced by 
human practices argued by Foucault (1980) and de Certeau (1984). 
The latter outline spatial techniques, for example mapping, which “not 
only represent space but also construct it. There is a relation between 
knowledge, practice, and the social construction of space” (Tiwari, 
2010, p. 14). She demonstrates how bodies inhabit, construct and 
represent space through performativity. The highly constrained, 
implicitly ritualized museum world is an excellent environment from 
which to look at the relationship between body and space as 
described by Tiwari. 
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Ritual strengthens the relationship between the body and 
the space, where the body does not view the space from 
afar, but plays a role in constructing it. Bodily performance 
becomes an essential part of experience and, in a way, 
many types of culture performances… become a means to 
understand life itself. (Tiwari, 2010, p. 31) 
 
The philosophic understanding of the past thirty to forty years has 
been that space and practice shape each other, but museums, with 
rare exceptions, appear not to have responded to this paradigmatic 
shift, they have not perceived the role of the subject in moving 
through physical space and thereby continually bringing the museum 
into being. In work reminiscent of Bachelard’s (1964) topoanalysis of 
the intimate spaces inhabited and created by bodies, Tiwari says 
 
It is the body that inscribes its thoughts, emotions, 
meanings, and memories onto the space, and in the 
process is transformed. Thus, the notion of body is not as 
simple as the physical body, but includes ideas of the 
physical and mental realm, as well as the individual, social 
and political body associated with it. (Tiwari, 2010, p. 18) 
 
Tiwari differentiates between viewing and inhabiting space.  
 
Space is a palimpsest. Over time, it acquires layers of 
meaning by the way it is inhabited. These layers of meaning 
can be uncovered to understand space. What the space 
denotes is understood by looking at it from a distance with a 
“viewpoint”, but in order to uncover the embedded 
connotations, it is important to look at it from within by 
inhabiting it. (Tiwari, 2010, p. 16)  
 
The “viewpoint” has been crucial to the operation of museums, setting 
visitors back from artefacts and reducing them to eyes only. For 
museum theory, therefore, parallel to the conception of space as an 
empty container is the concept of ocularcentrism, the idea that vision 
is our premier mode of knowing the world (Belova, 2012, p. 116). The 
dominance of vision permeates almost every aspect of contemporary 
culture. It is central to the operation of contemporary museums and 
underpins the fundamental “do not touch” prohibition in museums. 
The curatorial assumption is that looking at artefacts will provide all 
that visitors require in order to understand exhibitions. Of course, 
there are noteworthy departures from this assumption so as not to 
make it an absolute statement, but the rise of, for example, public 
programmes and affective exhibitions, and both their impact on the 
body and their textual reliance on the body (Harris, 2012), make only 
a philosophic dent in what is still an everyday, hegemonic viewing 
norm. Referencing Bourdieu’s (1993) analysis of the aloof, aesthetic 
gaze, Leahy describes the double decontextualizing movement – that 
is decontextualizing of both the object from its historic surrounds, and 
the viewer from her or his body – that resulted in the idealizing of 
practices of detachment in museums. 
 
Thus the museum produces the artwork as an object of 
attention and also the corresponding gaze of the 
disinterested viewer. This idealised gaze is prolonged, 
focused and also somewhat detached, although… in 
practice it was (and is) as often transitory and distracted. 
(Leahy, 2012, p. 5)  
 
The disembodied viewing practice was inculcated as the only correct 
and acceptable behaviour in museums and disallowed displays of 
spontaneous emotion or bodily exuberance. Even the famous 
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“museum fatigue” (Falk & Dierking, 2012, p.137), experienced in mind 
and body, is rarely catered for by museums, with places to rest bodies 
usually being few, far between, crowded and uncomfortable, 
suggesting that museums desire visitors to go on walking, although 
this fundamental ambulatory activity is, ironically, also 
unacknowledged. Huge visitor tension arises from this irony as 
management aims to keep visitors walking while their walking 
presences are assumed to remain outside the museum text. Only 
outdated, highly conservative conceptions of space and vision could 
have allowed this tension to be maintained for so long. 
 
Descartes’ seventeenth century writing on the importance of 
detached observation still frames contemporary inquiry methods. The 
route to knowledge, says Descartes, is by “fixing… eyes on a single 
point, [to] acquire through practice the ability to make perfect 
distinctions between things, however minute and delicate” 
(Descartes, 1637-1701 / 1985, quoted in Belova, 2012, p. 118). He 
continued by philosophising that the mind then made sense of what 
the eyes saw: “the objects that I thought I saw with my eyes, I really 
comprehended only by my mental power of judgement” (Descartes, 
1637-1701 / 1954, quoted in Belova, 2012, p. 118). The legacy of 
Descartes’ separation of mind and body is still with us. Belova 
explains how this separation led also to our conceptual separation 
from the physical world.  
 
This separation, as well as the idea of sight being an 
opening of the mind rather than the body, led to establish… 
observation as an objective, neutral activity, characterised 
as a detachment rather than engagement with the object of 
scrutiny. Mind (= sight) was thought to be able to perceive 
primary measurable qualities of an object… while body (= 
senses of touch, smell, etc.) could appreciate only its 
secondary qualities such as odour, texture, and taste. The 
latter could not be quantified and therefore almost polluted 
visual perceptions of the primary qualities. (Belova, 2012, p. 
118)  
 
Evidently, the non-visual senses have had almost no place in the 
development of the professional, public museum with its links to 
scientific, detached inquiry. By contrast, the visitor experience in early 
museums was as much through touch as vision; Classen (2005), 
noted above in the introduction, describes the importance of tactility in 
visits to these first museums.  
 
The sense of touch was believed to have access to interior 
truths of which sight was unaware. Celia Fiennes noted that 
the cane on display in the Ashmolean looked heavy, but 
when she picked it up she found that it was light. Touch 
functioned to correct the misconceptions of sight… Even in 
the eye-minded eighteenth century, when vision was widely 
lauded as the basis of cognition, there were still many 
considered touch. (Classen, 2005, p. 277) 
 
Ocularcentrism has thus displaced the other senses in understanding. 
Drawing on the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty (1968), Belova quotes 
his idea of “flesh” as a counterpoint to ocularcentrism. 
 
“Flesh is not a substance in-between the body and the world 
but is to be understood ‘functionally’ as texture, articulation, 
framework, joints, as an element in which we live and 
move… An intertwining forms between things, others and 
myself, a chiasmus or chiasma… [where] [w]hat is one’s 
own and what is not constantly more or less overlap but 
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never entirely coincide with each other”. Being made of the 
same stuff, body and the world are part of flesh. (Belova, 
2012, p. 121) 
 
Later work on affect by many others (for example, Ahmed, 2004; 
Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Massumi, 2002) has continued to show the 
interconnectedness of the human body with all facets of existence. 
The intensity of the experience of living was described in 2002 by 
Massumi with mind and body richly implicated in the world. 
 
The levels at play could be multiplied to infinity: already 
mentioned are mind and body, but also volition and 
cognition, at least two orders of language, expectation and 
suspense, body depth and epidermis. (Massumi, 2002, p. 
33) 
 
In affect analysis, there is no gap between the world and lived human 
experience, hence no gap between the museum visitor and the 
exhibition.  
 
Having given the briefest of surveys on space and viewing, I look now 
at the ICOM definition of a museum in light of the problematization of 
the human body in the museum space. This revised version of Article 
Three of the ICOM Statutes was adopted in Vienna in 2007 at the 
ICOM Triennial.  
 
A museum is a non-profit, permanent institution in the 
service of society and its development, open to the public, 
which acquires, conserves, researches, communicates and 
exhibits the tangible and intangible heritage of humanity and 
its environment for the purposes of education, study and 
enjoyment.  
(International Council of Museum, ICOM Statutes, (2007) 
Retrieved from http://archives.icom.museum/definition.html/ 
2014/04/03) 
 
Textually assumed to be disembodied, nevertheless visitors’ bodies 
pervade museums, but where are they in this definition? This 
definition is focussed on the service elements of a museum, it exists 
to give to society, but is implicitly independent of it. There is no sense 
that the museum arises from society or is evidence of that society; the 
museum, therefore, is itself in a state of detachment. The definition 
foregrounds the actions of a museum: it “acquires, conserves, 
researches, communicates and exhibits”. All of the actions are 
initiated by the institution and seem to flow unilaterally outwards to 
society which, it is implied, is an undifferentiated mass. There is no 
response, for example, to multicultural elements of evolving societies. 
The outward flowing of the services of the museum allows for no 
complex, interconnected communication as has been the assumed 
norm for reading books and newspapers, and for viewing films and 
television, for several decades (for example, Fiske, 1982) and is, of 
course, fundamental to the operation of the internet. The words 
“communicates and exhibits” imply an outward reach of the museum, 
but no sense of a reply or of the institution listening and certainly no 





I now turn to the issue of walking in museums as one aspect of 
embodiment that can be used to rethink the definition of a museum. 
The origin of this paper was in 2013 in the royal palace in Petrópolis 
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in Brazil, now the Museu Imperial de Petrópolis. This exquisite pink 
palace in the jungle is very popular with tourists. Beautifully 
conserved rooms and gardens are enjoyed by thousands, but inside 
the palace the visitors themselves become a humorous distraction. 
They are required to slip canvas-based sandals over their existing 
shoes. The sandals are very large and hamper normal movement. In 
order to move forward, most visitors adopt what looks like an action 
akin to cross-country skiing. Some visitors actually swing their arms in 
order to propel themselves across the highly polished wooden floors. 
In addition to this most-restricted walking style, museum attendants 
insist that visitors follow a strict path through the palace. This results 
in long queues of visitors gliding forward with many swinging their 
arms incongruously in a regal environment. A strange museum text 
emerges. The delightful palace rooms remain formal, but are undercut 
at every turn by hundreds of visitors who are assumed, curatorially, to 
be invisible. They are anything but invisible, they flood the rooms with 
their bizarre mobility and become one of the most memorable aspects 
of a visit to Petrópolis. There are many examples around the world 
where the restrictions on visitors result in unexpected textual 
elements that wreak havoc on carefully constructed curatorial texts. 
The sight of hundreds of pilgrims restrained by police barriers inside 
the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, for example, offers a 
prime example of a clash between the sanctity of the ancient church 
and the crudity of crowd control thus undermining a prayerful 
environment. If curators took into account the reality of their 
embodied visitors in the museum, they might begin to construct texts 
which incorporated them; their multiple backgrounds and politics 
would produce dense, rich texts. This paper confines itself to the most 
fundamental aspect of their reality, walking. 
 
Behind the disembodied eye of the imagined visitor, there is very 
often a weary body trudging through the halls of a vast institution. Or 
perhaps one might find the thrilled body of the first-time visitor to a 
tourist highlight such as the Vatican Museums. Enthused, this body 
tries to embrace all that the splendid salons have to offer and at some 
point finds itself in the Sistine Chapel being restrained by attendants 
from stretching out at length on the floor in order better to view the 
famous ceiling. Maybe, we should imagine the visitor’s body as one of 
a tired parent carrying an even wearier toddler. All of these bodies are 
walking in a museum. What does it mean to walk? 
 
Making known scholarly analyses of walking to wider, popular 
audiences has been bedevilled by walking’s taken-for-granted status. 
This is unfortunate because writing on walking has articulated 
empowering elements for the ordinary person, making him or her 
central to textual resistance and generation of narratives. Michel de 
Certeau’s great study of everyday life sets out a triple function of 
walking by which ordinary people stake a claim to the public world 
and effectively speak, or enunciate it. He says walking  
 
is a process of appropriation of the topographical system on 
the part of the pedestrian… it is a spatial acting out of the 
place… and it implies relations among differentiated 
positions… It thus seems possible to give a preliminary 
definition of walking as a space of enunciation… Walking 
affirms, suspects, tries out, transgresses, respects, etc., the 
trajectories it speaks… (de Certeau, 1984, p. 98)  
 
In the many analyses of walking, one finds comparisons of it to 
speaking, a human trait which is popularly held to share no similarity 
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to motion. Lund, however, demonstrates how the landscape is 
narrated via the walker as a phenomenological aspect of life. 
 
[Walking], consciously or unconsciously [is] an act of 
exploration because walking is always about heading in a 
direction; the explorations can be as much directed 
inwardly, towards the body, as they are directed outwardly, 
and simultaneously they can be directed both inwardly and 
outwardly depending on how the body and the landscape 
enmesh. (Lund, 2012, p. 226)  
 
Lund argues that the world is in formation through acts of walking. 
Walking does not take place in a pre-formed landscape (Lund, 2012, 
p. 227). Neither is the self pre-formed, prior to walking.   
 
Traversing the ground is about traversing the self… one is 
always in a continuous process of becoming… [one] can 
reveal a sense of belonging in the movement itself that is 
reflected through the appearance of the landscape… [one] 
walks through. (Lund, 2012, p. 231) 
 
Landscape and self thus come into being entwined in movement. 
Psychogeography offers many examples of making the self and 
landscape through walking. Smith (2010, p. 120), for example, revisits 
the Situationists’ dérive and arrives at mythogeography. Algorhythmic 
walking in Venice offers another example: always taking the first turn 
to the left and then the second to the right demonstrates lived 
experience as mapping (Whybrow, 2011, p. 282) and paves the way 
for “mappings to take the form of embodied responses to the city” (p. 
288).  Specific psychogeographic political intentions include walking 
as a subversive act which insists on seeing the city as mysterious and 
walking to overcome its banal characteristics (Coverley, 2006, p. 14). 
The great value of the work of Lund, which includes an analysis of 
such everyday activities as managing heavy shopping bags while 
negotiating sharp winds and slippery surfaces outside a supermarket 
in Iceland, is that it shows that one need only to be mindful in order to 
understand oneself as coming into being through acts of walking, that 
awareness of the power of walking requires only an act of reflection. 
Recalling the recent tussle with wind and ice in Reykavik, she says,  
 
I tried to organise this short trip to the shop in my head as I 
jotted down a few notes. In contrast to the surroundings of 
my living room it felt somehow disorderly, obscure and 
difficult to put the notes together into a linear sequence. 
There were initially no forms in which I could express my 
experience, only entangled but muddled feelings of 
discomfort. It was only with effort that I could put the 
experience into a coherent narrative. (Lund, 2012, p. 277) 
 
Several writers have developed the enunciative function of walking as 
narrating the landscape and bringing coherence to it. Forgione’s 
discussion of the concepts of walking in nineteenth century Paris 
focuses on many of the iconic Impressionist paintings of the everyday 
as expressions of combined seeing and walking. 
 
My account, then, proposes to complicate or revise our 
traditional sense of the Impressionists as forging an “optical” 
practice. What emerges in these pictures is a sophisticated 
alertness to precisely the coherent intertwining of body, 
mind, and vision insisted on in the history of writing about 
walking. (Forgione, 2005, p. 664) 
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The linking of body, mind and vision is crucial for museum analysis, 
which has proceeded usually with an assumption of the disembodied 
eye carrying the “gaze of the disinterested viewer” (Leahy, 2012, p. 
4). If we re-conceptualise the visitor as a full corporeal creature, in 
which mind, body and vision work together, then, to date, almost all 
assumptions about visitors in exhibition spaces appear far from reality 
and suggest the misrecognition of the identities of both visitors and 
institutions. Merleau-Ponty (1968) and later writers on affect have 
philosophized an unshakeable connection between bodies and the 
world, in fact interconnectedness. The inner world of the visitor can 
be seen to merge with the outer world, the energising quality of 
walking giving rise to what Leahy (2012, p. 79) describes as an 
“intense feeling of self-presence”. Forgione alerts us to the long 
history of thinking about walking’s ability to produce us as beings 
integrated with, rather than separate from, our environment. 
 
Walking’s ability to integrate inner and outer worlds is a 
consistent theme in the literature on the subject, which holds 
the process to operate in this way: the physical motions of 
ambulation activate the walker’s inner, thinking self and 
thereby bring that self into contact with the external world, 
an encounter that gives rise to a reciprocal exchange or 
oscillating flow between inward and outward attention. That 
account of how walking actually works in experience 
emerged with increasing clarity during the nineteenth 
century. (Forgione, 2005, p. 669)  
 
The inner and outer link afforded by walking is not acknowledged by 
museums, even when they propose walks to the visitor. Attempts by 
museums all over the world to restrict walking to specified trails – 
developed ostensibly for efficiency or linear flow of objects – cannot 
encapsulate the embodied meaning experiences of visitors. The 
Vatican Museums’ famous trails, which were set out to assist visitors 
in reaching their key points of interests in the most efficient manner, 
are constantly resisted. Visitors double back, move across 
monumental stairways to join other trails and call out to others on 
different trails. Walking blurs objects, negates curatorial comment and 
invents pathways unknown to the museum. Writing of the endless 
variety in walking, even over the same terrain, for example of an 
apparently static museum space, de Certeau observes: 
 
all the modalities sing a part in this chorus, changing from 
step to step, stepping in through proportions, sequences, 
and intensities which vary according to the time the path 
taken and the walker. These enunciatory operations are of 
an unlimited diversity. They therefore cannot be reduced to 
the graphic trail. (de Certeau, 1984, p. 99)   
 
There are signs that, even in the context of opening up to visitors, the 
most progressive of curators still move to restrict or incorporate the 
reality of visitors’ bodies in exhibition halls. Falk and Dierking take it 
as a standard fact that there is high predictability in museum 
behaviour because they are  
 
“behavior settings” which elicit common suites of behaviors. 
Many of the people entering the museum have learned what 
to expect and how they and others should behave to insure 
that “correct” and “appropriate” behaviors for a place such 
as this are followed. (Falk & Dierking, 2012, p. 144) 
 
The restrictions are not so much corporeal as they were, say, thirty 
years ago; today the restriction is often more fundamental, denying 
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visitors a role in generating meaning by the incorporation of “aberrant” 
meanings. Leahy (2012) describes the colonisation of the vast 
Turbine Hall by visitors at Tate Modern in London as being so intense 
that it can undermine the works on display. She refers to the 
experiences of the exhibition of Shibboleth by Doris Salcedo, a giant 
crack in the floor over which visitors could wander, leap or even insert 
their arms and hands. She notes that visitors have become 
“performatively attuned” (Leahy, 2012, p. 111) to the extreme point of 
resisting exhibitions. The visitors’ atmosphere at Tate Modern worked 
against the expected dark mood of Shibboleth. 
 
the audience at Tate Modern had become used to 
consuming the Turbine Hall as playground and photo 
opportunity: it was impossible for Shibboleth to project its 
more sombre message onto the flow of pleasured, 
entertainment-seeking and self-conscious bodies. The issue 
was not so much whether certain corporeal responses were 
more or less appropriate to the work, but rather the 
recognition that the bodies of visitors were interpretative 
agents that were generating new meanings of Shibboleth 
through their actions and reactions. These were 
improvisational bodies acting against the institutional and 
artistic intention by encountering the world on their own 
terms. (Leahy, 2012, p. 111) 
 
Given the extensive writing on empowerment of museum visitors and 
the ideals of incorporating them into exhibition texts, one might have 
expected that Tate Modern would perhaps record the meanings made 
by visitors as a way of adding to the possible meanings of the work. 
The opposite, of course, was the reality; the institution preferred to 
maintain control of meaning as much as possible, despite its current 
vision statement about its open relationship to its audiences. 
 
Tate’s 2015 vision is to be more  
Open by being receptive to new ideas, encouraging debate, 
exchange and collaboration within and beyond Tate, and by 
being more inviting to more people (“Tate Modern, Mission 
2015”, 2014).    
 
A positive attitude to the power of visitors is evident in the vision 
statement, but it appears to have been at odds with the museum’s 
reaction to the unexpected and unwelcome behaviour of visitors 
during the exhibition of Shibboleth. Leahy describes the multitude of 
visitor responses, including falling into the crack, as running counter 
to museum authority.  
 
The moment of dissent was, however, fleeting as the 
museum swiftly reincorporated these “transgressive” bodies 
into a strategy of audience development that embraced both 
the contrasting corporeal regimes of the modernist white 
cube gallery and the permissive “street” of the Turbine Hall. 
(Leahy, 2012, p. 112) 
 
The experience at Tate Modern highlights the intriguing museological 
moment in which we now find ourselves. On one hand, museums are 
full of rhetoric about the activities of visitors and, on the other, are 
certainly not yet ready to relinquish their authority by recognising the 
corporeal presence of their visitors.  
 
Ironically, despite seeming to insist on old authority modes, museums 
are opening up to art installations which explore the body in the 
museum. There are several examples of such artworks. Tino Sehgal’s 
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“constructed situations” (“Tino Sehgal”, n.d.) bring about live 
encounters between people in museums; this is sometimes very 
uncomfortable for visitors, making them aware of their bodies in the 
museum space and new and possibly unwanted ways of making 
meaning. His work is not documented officially and exists only in the 
memory of those who experienced it. Marina Abramović Presents 
(Leahy, 2012, p. 86) explored museum walking in Whitworth Art 
Gallery in Manchester in 2009. Abramović’s performance art, “The 
Public Drill”, curated visitors’ bodies by drilling them in new walking 
and looking methods. After an hour of preparatory drilling, visitors 
were free to wander in the museum, the expectation being that the 
drill would have set up an interrogation of any previous museum 
visiting habits. Noteworthy also is Martin Creed’s running exhibition 
Work No. 850 (Leahy, 2012, p. 87), in which a series of people ran 
through Tate Britain overturning all firmly held decorum and thus 
bringing it into question. If museums are prepared to host exhibitions 
that query the visiting habits of visitors, especially of their walking, it 
must surely be time for museums to include reflection on corporeality 
in the museum definition. 
 
 
A new definition of a museum? 
 
This paper will not attempt to redefine a museum, but will gesture 
towards issues that will need to be taken into account when doing so 
in the light of potential and urgent recognition of embodied visitors. It 
is evident that, although I note these issues in relation to visitor 
embodiment, they have already been highlighted in critical responses 
over the past twenty years to the many challenges of postmodernity 
and post-colonialism. 
 
First, rather than being preliminary producers of narratives, museums 
would become understood as spaces of multiple narratives brought 
into being via visitors’ walking. The first implication of this would be 
that rather than seeking to control meaning, as was possibly the case 
at Tate Modern noted above, the museum would be a space in which 
conflicting narratives could co-exist as an habitual, institutional 
enablement. The museum itself would thus be in a state of becoming, 
an open-ended institution. 
 
Secondly, the critical textual move away from an emphasis on the 
producer (curator and museum as an authoring institution) and the 
product (exhibition) as the key components of museum meaning 
would seem completed by the acknowledgment of embodiment. 
There has been a gradual acceptance of the visitor via exhibitions 
which promote dialogue, but an embodied presence, rather than a 
restricted mental presence, would go further. As noted earlier in this 
paper, the acceptance of an embodied presence is rare, with 
exceptions proving the rule of assumed disembodiment. Hence, 
Daniel Libeskind’s Jewish Museum Berlin and Te Papa in New 
Zealand, which rely on the visitor’s emotional and bodily responses, 
remain among only a handful of institutions to do so. 
 
Embodiment would be likely to give rise to certain responses that 
have not been permissible for a long time. Highly emotional 
engagement, for example, could be expected. Currently, the only 
expectation of emotionality by museums has been in relation to 
Stendhal’s Syndrome, the experience of which leaves the visitor 
overwhelmed by the coincidence of great art, history and often 
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religion to the point of psychiatric collapse. Stendhal’s Syndrome, in 
the current museum climate, is regarded as an exception.  
 
If embodiment were anticipated, then intense emotionality might be 
expected and worked into exhibitions. After many decades of the 
hegemony of viewing detachment, the idea of emotionality has often 
seemed completely out of place in the museum, even laughable to 
some because displays of emotion are often understood in the 
western world to be signs of loss of control and even irrationality. 
There are, however, many examples where detachment has broken 
down or abandonment of it urged. The Ave Maria Purissima exhibition 
in Cebu in the Philippines allowed the viewing of 27 famous images of 
the Virgin Mary. The exhibition curator urged visitors to the exhibition 
in Cebu Cathedral Museum to pray (“Ave Maria Purissima”, 2013). 
Although the religious environment of the exhibition might suggest 
that an emotional religious response was not out of the ordinary, it is 
important to note that the exhibition took place in the museum, not in 
the Cathedral itself. The broader museum environment is not 
associated today with emotional expression, for example the Vatican 
Museums are not particularly sacred until one reaches the Sistine 
Chapel where attendants have the difficult task of imposing a solemn 
environment on rowdy visitors. Likewise, the Louvre has hundreds of 
masterpieces which were designed for display in churches, but which 
have found their way to the dispassionate viewing environment of the 
Louvre. In this wider context, the call to prayer in front of images is 
indeed highly unusual. Strong emotionality and even transcendence, 
however, are far from unusual in the museum environment. Soren 
(2009) and Latham (2012) describe experiences in which visitors 
have felt outside themselves transported and in mystical connection 
with the universe. Of particular interest for this paper is Latham’s 
description of people experiencing unsettling and profoundly moving 
museum moments through their bodies.  
 
A numinous event is characterised by several physically, 
visually, and spatially perceived elements. Participants 
actually felt time and space alter and physically reacted to 
the encounter through their body. (Latham, 2012, p. 10) 
 
If the most intense of encounters are to be experienced via the body, 
then it is a duty of museums to embrace it in exhibition. 
 
Thirdly, we would need to live with the idea of incompletion. Such 
disquiet, of course, has been part of postmodernity for at least thirty 
years, but there has been a nostalgic longing for this not to be the 
case in museums, expressed in a myriad of ways related to lingering 
museum authority. Carr speaks of this disquiet in positive terms.  
 
The purpose of the museum at its best is, like the purpose 
of a great educator, to cause some kind of troubling 
incompleteness for the user, and so to inspire human 
change. (Carr, 2001, p. 176)   
 
Museum exhibitions that aim to provoke visitors to question, comment 
and learn more have been a museological ideal for some long time. 
Carr’s description of a positive “incompleteness” at the heart of the 
museum experience emerges from the idea of performativity – that 
visitors are in a performing environment which necessarily leads to 
open-ended experiences. 
 
In the very act of presenting itself, every museum becomes 
committed to a narrative about the construction of its 
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world… every museum user needs the opportunity to move, 
mind and body, into the narrative until it merges with the 
user’s own. (Carr, 2001, p. 182) 
 
Rather than working with the visitor’s narrative, it might be more 
accurate to speak of a new narrative emerging through each visitor. 
Lund reminds us that  
 
paths and routes that the wandering feet follow shape 
stories as they direct the walks, and are simultaneously 
shaped during the course of the walk. Different narratives 
provide a different ambience and each has its own 
character. Sometimes they flow smoothly but sometimes the 
tone can be disorderly and even troublesome depending on 
how the landscape lends itself to the walking body and how 
the walker lends him / herself to the landscape. (Lund, 2012, 
p. 226) 
 
Arnold’s (2012, p. 29) thoughts on a new kind of “aesthetic of 
labyrinthine open-endedness, of permanent incompletion and 
perpetual (self) questioning by testing the limits” are useful. Such 
open-endedness could lead to great dynamism of meaning. 
 
Fourthly, performativity would be recognised in a new museum 
definition. The idea of a separate space for the museum, utterly 
disconnected from the disembodied visitor who is reduced to an eye, 
would seem textually impossible. The performative qualities of the 
visitor would be valued side-by-side with the value of artefacts. The 
concept of visitor interaction with artefacts, as opposed to the simple 
viewing of them, would become a reality of museum experiences. 
This is not to suggest that artefacts ought to be placed in danger, nor 
that routine touching, common in previous centuries, ought to be 
reinstated. Obviously, artefacts precious to the whole community 
would need to be protected from physical damage. Copies, however, 
already made for sight-impaired visitors, and in other centuries for art 
students and museums without original objects, might well become a 
new norm in museums as the central importance of visitor 





In recognising the embodied presence of visitors in museum spaces, 
we are left with questions, but very few answers. This paper has 
argued that the ICOM definition of a museum is now outmoded 
because it does not incorporate an understanding of the textually 
embodied presence of visitors. This paper has also suggested that 
even the most progressive of museums, such as Tate Modern, are 
likely to have difficulties in managing or responding to chaotic 
generations of meaning. 
 
Should museums attempt routinely to capture the plethora of 
meanings that become available via visitors? This is a difficult 
question to answer and has been floating around ever since 
commentators in the field began to realise that the producer (or artist 
or curator) and the product (or exhibition or art work) were only two 
parts of a triangle of meaning. Would we all be interested in hearing 
about the meanings of others? Do we prefer to encounter the product 
or artwork in solitude? Various critics have collected multiple 
meanings, very often in order to mount arguments concerning 
widespread resistance to control of meaning. The meanings that were 
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collected were usually those that were able to be explained very 
clearly by highly articulate visitors, often in response to carefully 
framed questions by the investigator. If we are now to move beyond 
cerebral meanings to addressing issues of the corporeal entwined 
with the cerebral, we face new challenges of accessing meaning. Do 
we wish to push visitors to explain meanings that they experienced so 
strongly via the body that they were difficult to articulate, for example 
those that were experienced by Lund (2012) on her icy return from 
the supermarket? What would it mean for museums to flood us with 
intense meanings including the dispassionate, detached experiences 
of others? 
 
Another area of questioning concerns empowering embodied visitors. 
Is there a way that we can give more to visitors in recognising their 
embodied presence? At this time in museological history, the most 
useful thing we can do is be alive to the pending revelation of new 
museum realities. We should start by addressing the issue of 
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Challenges to museum curatorial control of meaning, combined with 
interest in the reading positions of visitors, have led to the growth of 
interactive interpretation strategies. Such strategies, however, often 
privilege curatorial pre-determined responses and presuppose that 
visitors are disembodied, that actual bodies moving through 
exhibition spaces are not, in fact, the palpable reality of a museum 
experience. Visitors have a kind of textual invisibility. Consideration 
of visitor performativity and embodiment in museums poses an 
exhilarating museological challenge. Museums need to come to 
terms with the bodily aspects of a museum visit, understanding that 
visitors enact their narrations of the museum as they walk through it. 
This paper argues that, by textually denying the corporeal presence 
of visitors, museums continually misrecognise their own institutional 
identity as they theorize themselves as separate from the visitor. 
Examination of the walking visitor shows that a museum is not 
separate from the visitor, but comes into being through her or his 





Incarnation des visiteurs au musée. Qu'est-ce qu'un musée ? 
Les défis au contrôle du sens par le conservateur, combinés avec 
l'intérêt porté aux positions de lecture des visiteurs ont conduit au 
développement de stratégies d'interprétation interactives. 
Néanmoins, de telles stratégies privilégient souvent des réponses 
prédéterminées par le conservateur et présupposent que les 
visiteurs sont désincarnés, que les corps qui se déplacent dans 
l'espace de l'exposition ne constituent pas en fait la réalité de 
l'expérience du musée. Les visiteurs ont de fait une invisibilité 
textuelle. La prise en considération de la performativité et de 
l'incarnation du visiteur dans un musée représente un défi pour la 
muséologie.  Les musées doivent admettre la physicalité d'une visite 
au musée, acceptant le fait que les visiteurs mettent en scène leurs 
récits alors qu'ils se déplacent. Cet article soutient qu'en niant la 
présence corporelle des visiteurs, les musées s'illusionnent 
continuellement sur leur propre identité, se percevant comme une 
Jennifer Harris                                          115 
ICOFOM Study Series, 43b, 2015 
entité séparée. L'examen du visiteur incarné montre que c'est par le 
fait même de sa présence en mouvement qu'un musée se met à 
exister. Quel va en être l'impact sur la définition d'un musée ?
  
